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London: Remedy in Florida When Condemning Authority Proceeds in Bad Faith

REMEDY IN FLORIDA WHEN CONDEMNING
AUTHORITY PROCEEDS IN BAD FAITH
ERaNEST

J. LoNDON*

The Supreme Court of Florida has characterized the power of

eminent domain as "one of the most harsh proceedings known to the
law."'

tory3

Even where circumscribed by constitutional2 and statu-

safeguards, the peremptory appropriation of private property is
nonetheless inherently oppressive, and the court has in recent decisions expressed the determination to adopt whatever "additional
tools" are necessary to assure that the property owner is treated fairly
when there is a taking of all, or any part, of his property. 4
Although the frustration of plans and hopes is unavoidable in any
such taking, a property owner is at least reasonably assured of
adequate indemnification when the condemning authority follows
through in good faith and promptly pays whatever damages are
awarded in the proceedings. Where, however, property is encumbered with condemnation proceedings in bad faith, without any purpose to take and to pay for the property, an intolerable situation is
created. 5 In one case,6 for example, a municipality adopted a reso*B.A., M.A., University of Michigan; LL.B. 1951, Harvard University; Author
of "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MicH. L. REv. 835
(1959); Member of Illinois and Miami, Florida, bars.
1. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 314, 31 So.
2d 483, 485 (1947).
2. FLA. CONST. Deel, of Rights, §12: "nor shall private property be taken
without just compensation"; FLA. CoNsT. art. 16, §29: "no private property,
nor right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation or individual
until full compensation therefor shall be first made to the owner, or first secured
to him by deposit of money.....
3. FLA. STAT. ch. 73 (1961), covering the procedure for the taking of property after the ascertainment of compensation and FLA. STAT. ch. 74 (1961),
covering the procedure for the emergency taking of property prior to the ascertainment of compensation.
4. See Shell v. State Road Dep't, 135 So. 2d 857, 861 (Fla. 1961) authorizing
order to require condemning authority to produce for inspection and copying,
opinions and reports of its expert appraisers, as an exception to "ordinary cases";
Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. DuPree Co., 108 So. 2d 289,
292 (Fla. 1958) authorizing compensation for cost of moving personal property
to new business site after filing of proceedings to condemn old site.
5. This and related questions are treated generally (and mostly unsatisfactorily, because of the failure to discuss and analyze underlying theories) in the
following sources: 31 A.L.R. 352 (1924); 92 A.L.R. 379 (1934); 121 A.L.R.
12 (1939); 18 Am. Jun. Eminent Domain §371 (1938); 30 C.J.S. Eminent Domain
§339 (1942); 6 Nicnor..s, Emmrr DomAin §§26, 45 (3d ed. 1909).
6. Friendship Cemetery v. Mayor & City Council, 200 Md. 430, 90 A.2d
[424]
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lution to appropriate a cemetery that was needed for an airport.
However, instead of promptly commencing condemnation proceedings and leaving the determination of the price to the procedures established by law, the municipality refrained from filing suit, but
haggled with the cemetery for more than three years about the price.
Meanwhile, no one would buy burial lots, for fear the bodies would
have to be removed if the property was finally appropriated (some
bodies were actually exhumed and buried elsewhere), all of which
had a devastating effect on the business affairs of the cemetery.
Eventually, the municipality acquired other property in the area and
proceeded to build the airport around the cemetery. The cemetery
thereupon sued for $250,000 damages, alleging that the municipality
had acted in bad faith and unreasonably, using the threat of condemnation in a deliberate effort to depreciate the cemetery property,
so as to acquire it at a reduced price.
In another case,7 a municipality filed condemnation proceedings
against a tract of land, on which a high-rise apartment building was
then in process of construction under a building permit that the
municipality had issued only two weeks earlier. The resolution to
condemn the property, purportedly for use as a city park and public
off-street parking area, had been hurriedly adopted by the city
council, during the last council session before a scheduled election in
which the seats of several of the council members were being hotly
contested. There had been no prior notice to the property owner
and no prior feasibility survey, and it appeared that the condemnation
proceedings had been fied in a deliberate effort to halt further construction on the high-rise, in response to political pressure by an organized group of owners of small apartment houses, who were fearful
of competition.
Although the property owner could have contested the propriety
of the taking in the condemnation proceedings proper, in a hearing
preliminary to trial,8 or in a separate injunctive suit, 9 relief in either
695 (1952).
7. City of Miami Beach v. Two Seventy-Sixth Street, Inc., Case No. 63L1844,
Dade County Circuit Court, June 17, 1963.
8. City of Miami v. Wolfe, 150 So. 2d 489 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963). How-

ever, as the Supreme Court of Florida said in Rott v. City of Miami Beach,
94 So. 2d 168, 173 (Fla. 1957): "The finding of the City Council on the question of necessity is one which may not be easily or casually overthrown by the
courts. It requires strong and convincing evidence of the most conclusive character to upset the findings of the elected officials charged with the reponsibility of
operating the city government in matters of this kind."
9. See Isleworth Grove Co. v. Orange County, 79 Fla. 208, 212, 84 So. 83,
84 (1920), where the court held that injunctive relief was available where "a
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case would ordinarily have come too late to prevent substantial injury. The mere filing of the condemnation proceedings, spread upon
the public records by a notice of lis pendens, forced the immediate
suspension of construction. Even assuming that an adjudication of
the propriety of the taking could have been had in a bare minimum
of three or four months including the time for appeal necessary to
settle the matter with finality, financing commitments would, in the
meantime, have expired and the substantial commissions and costs
customarily paid in connection therewith have been forfeited. Also,
income from the impending winter season would have been lost (the
property owner having scheduled the project so as to be able to collect such income and having relied upon it, as well as the financing
proceeds, to meet his obligations). Furthermore, damages to the contractor for breach would have been incurred, since under article 23 of
the General Conditions attached to the form of construction contract
approved by the American Institute of Architects, which is in general
use in the construction industry, the contractor may terminate the
contract and recover from the owner if work is stopped for thirty days
by public authority.
Since the margin between success and failure in such an enterprise
is often a narrow one, the mere filing of condemnation proceedings
could, therefore, be fatal, cutting off the funds upon which the property owner depended to meet his obligations and subjecting the
property to the liens of the contractor, architect, and others. In
fact, assuming that the reason for filing the condemnation proceedings
in the first instance was to prevent the completion of the high-rise,
the municipality would probably be satisfied in abandoning the proceedings at just about the time that the issue of the propriety of the
taling was ready for final hearing. Success of the property owner
on that issue, therefore, would be like locking the barn after the horse
has been stolen, at a time when all that can really count is restitution
for the loss.10
plain case of the abuse of the right of eminent domain by county commissioners
is shown."
10. The author was of counsel for the property owner in the case of the
high-rise. Because of the financial pressures that have been described in the
text, a pragmatic decision was made not to contest the propriety of the condemnation, since success on this issue would have amounted to a Pyrrhic victory. As
it was, notwithstanding that an immediate answer was filed detailing the peculiar
plight of the property owner, together with a motion for an advanced trial date,
the earliest trial date which could be secured was the week of September 80,
1963, which would have been more than three months after the filing of the
condemnation proceedings. Immediate efforts were then begun to obtain a
settlement from the municipality, that acquired an element of desperation when
reports were heard that the municipality was about to abandon the proceedings
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In view of the adaptability with which Florida courts have protected the rights of property owners in cases where there is a taking of
all, or any part, of a person's property, it would be incongruous if an
appropriate remedy were not also adopted in those cases where a
property owner is as grievously injured by the bad faith of the condemning authority in commencing or abandoning the proceedings.
IEcoVERY OF DAiAGEs IN INDEPENDENT ACnON AGAINST
CONDEMNING Aumo~rr

In the case of the cemetery, the property owner sued the municipality for damages in an independent action, and the Supreme
Court of Maryland held that a good cause of action was stated. 1
Although the theory upon which the right of recovery was predicated
was not analyzed in the decision, a long history of Maryland cases
was reviewed in which it was regularly repeated that such a cause of
action does lie against the condemning authority. In some jurisdictions, it has been said to sound in tort.12 In others, it has been based
directly on a constitutional provision that "private property shall not

be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." 13

The Supreme Court of Florida, however, has pointed out that the
Florida Constitution authorizes recovery only for the taking of property, and not for damages, and that, in the absence of authorization of
recovery for such damages, there must be an actual taking of property, or some part of it, before an owner is entitled to compensation.' 4
altogether.

(The right of the condemning authority to voluntarily dismiss or

abandon condemnation proceedings is discussed in detail in the text beginning
at note 25 infra.) Although far from sure of its recourse in the event of attempted
abandonment, the property owner nonetheless boldly threatened reprisal. Amidst
these conflicting uncertainties and pressures, a settlement was finally made on
August 16, 1968, two months after the condemnation proceedings were filed, in
which the property owner accepted approximately half of the amount that it
was prepared to prove if the case had gone to trial.
11. Friendship Cemetery v. Mayor & City Council, supra note 6.
12. See State v. Beck, 33 Mo. 1118, 63 S.W.2d 814 (1933), where it was
said that such a cause of action "must be sought in an action sounding in tort";
Simpson v. Kansas City, 111 Mo. 237, 241, 20 S.W. 88 (1892), where an
allegation that the proceedings "were needlessly, wrongfully and vexatiously continued" by the condemning authority was held to state a cause of action; Upper
Third St. Dev. Corp. v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 595, 99 N.W.2d 687
(1959); Feiten v. City of Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 494, 2 N.W. 1148 (1879) where
the cause of action was compared to one for slander of title.
13. Roach v. Village of Winnetka, 366 Ill. 578, 581-82, 10 N.E.2d 356,
357-58 (1937); Winkelman v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 860, 72 N.E. 1066 (1904).
14. Arandel Corp. v. Griffin, 89 Fla. 128, 103 So. 422 (1925). Plaintiff,
in an action at law for damages, alleged that property was periodically flooded
following unusually heavy rainfalls, as a result of negligent operations by Ever-
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Unless thus brought under the constitutional or statutory provisions
pertaining to condemnation, the state and its agencies are immune
from suit.1
The sovereign immunity barrier was considerably lowered in
Florida in the precedent-breaking decision of Hargrove v. Town of
Cocoa Beach,16 where a municipality was sued for damages for the
wrongful death of a police prisoner who had died of smoke suffocation.
Arrested in an intoxicated condition, the prisoner had been locked
up and then left unattended. Under prior decisions, the municipality would be deemed to have been acting in a governmental, as
distinguished from a proprietary, capacity and would be held immune
from suit. The Supreme Court of Florida, acknowledging that it was
receding from the prior decisions, abolished the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions and held that a municipality
was liable for the negligence of its employees under such facts. Using
general language that was broad enough to suggest that the sovereign immunity doctrine might be discarded altogether, the court nonetheless expressly preserved municipal immunity from suits arising
out of the negligent performance of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
functions.' 7 Subsequent district court of appeal decisions have, in
addition, reasserted municipal immunity from suits arising out of intentional torts, so that the trend now appears to be unfavorable to an
action in tort against a municipality for damages caused by the undertaking of condemnation proceedings in bad faith, because of both
glades Drainage District. The court stated that since the flooding was not permanent, it was not the equivalent of a taking.
15. Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1956). In a suit in
equity, plaintiff sought restitution for alleged benefits acquired by the county
at plaintiff's expense, or in the alternative, a decree compensating plaintiff for
such benefits. The complaint alleged that while engaged in highway construction adjoining plaintiff's property, the county destroyed lateral support of plaintiff's land and buildings and impaired ingress and egress, as well as previously
existing view. The court held that although the plaintiff's property was damaged,
it was not taken, and the plaintiff's cause of action, therefore, sounded in tort.
As such, it was barred by the immunity of the sovereign.
16. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
17. After saying "that the time has arrived to declare this doctrine anachoristic [sic] not only to our system of justice but to our traditional concepts of
democratic government," the court then expressly reaffirmed the earlier decisions
of Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378 (1938) in which
it was held that a municipality cannot be sued for damages for enforcing an
unconstitutional ordinance, a quasi-legislative function and Akin v. City of Miami,
65 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1953) in which it was held that a municipality cannot be
sued for damages for wrongful refusal to grant a building permit, a quasijudicial function. Id. at 132.
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its quasi-legislative and intentional-tort characteristics.' s Moreover,
Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, at best, applies only to suits
against municipalities, whereas the immunity of state and county
agencies continues undiminished. 19
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida has not been indifferent to the dilemma in which a property owner is placed when
condemnation proceedings are not prosecuted in good faith. In State
Road Department v. Tharp,20 for example, a creek adjacent to a mill
was filled in connection with road construction, thereby permanently
raising the elevation of the water in the millrace and reducing the
capacity of the mill by half. The State Road Department refused
to compensate the mill owner, who thereupon sued for an injunction
to require removal of the fill so that the water level in the millrace
would subside to its normal level. In lieu of requiring removal of the
fill, the chancellor gave the State Road Department the privilege
of exercising the right of eminent domain, as a means of making restitution to the property owner. The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed
2
on appeal, and in a strongly worded opinion, the court declared: 1
If a State agency can deliberately trespass on and destroy the
property of the citizen in the manner shown to have been done
here and then be relieved from making restitution on the
plea of non-liability of the State for suit, then the constitutional
guaranty of the right to own and dispose of property becomes
nothing more than the tinkling of empty words. Such a holding
would raise administrative boards above the law and clothe
them with an air of megalomania that would eternally jeopar18. In Steinhardt v. Town of North Bay Village, 132 So. 2d 764 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1961), it was held that a municipality could not be sued for damages
because of its omission to provide adequate fire fighting facilities and equipment,
a quasi-legislative function; and in Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach,
113 So. 2d 431 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959), that a municipality could not be sued
for damages because the clerk of the municipal court had acted falsely and
maliciously in issuing an arrest warrant (a quasi-judicial function) and the police
officer who executed it knew that it was void (an intentional tort). In Thompson
v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105, 107 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961), the court
declared that "the Hargrove doctrine of municipal liability for torts of municipal
employees should not be extended to include the intentional torts of such employees." But see Simpson v. City of Miami, 155 So. 2d 829 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1963), where two members of the court, with one member dissenting, held that
a cause of action would lie against a municipality for an intentional tort, so long
as the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
19. See Smith v. Duval County Welfare Bd., 118 So. 2d 98, 99 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1960).
20. 146 Fla. 745, 1 So. 2d 868 (1941).
21. Id. at 749, 1 So. 2d at 869-70.
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dize the property right of the citizens. It would reverse the
order of democracy in this country and head it into a blind
alley.
The Supreme Court of Florida also affirmed the chancellor in State
Road Department v. Bender,2 2 where several property owners filed
a class suit in equity, to require the State Road Department to restore certain quantifies of shell, curbing, sidewalk, and builder's sand
that had been removed without consent or compensation, or in the
alternative, to require it to prosecute condemnation proceedings to
determine the value of the properties appropriated and to pay such
amount. A motion to dismiss the complaint was denied, and on final
hearing the chancellor himself determined the value of the property
taken and decreed that said sum be paid into the registry of the court
for the benefit of the respective property owners. On appeal, the
Florida Supreme Court pointed out that equity could assume jurisdiction because it was a class suit, and the usual practice of transferring
the case to the law side for condemnation proceedings could properly
be dispensed with.
In State Road Department v. Darby,2 3 the property owner complained that the State Road Department had been negligent in the
construction of an adjacent road, with the result that a substantial
amount of red clay, sand, and silt was washed onto his property,
causing permanent damage. The State Road Department refused
to compensate the property owner, who thereupon sued in equity to
enjoin the trespass and, in the alternative, requested that the State
Road Department be required to exercise its right of eminent domain
as a means of making restitution for the damages. Upon final hearing, the chancellor entered an order finding that there had been a
taking of a portion of the property for public use without just compensation and transferred the case to the law side of the court "for a
determination of the amount of property taken and the value of such
property through a proceeding in the nature of condemnation procedings." 24 In affirming, the First District Court of Appeal de-

clared:

25

22. 147 Fla. 15, 2 So. 2d 298 (1941).
23. 109 So. 2d 591 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
24. Id. at 592.
25. Id.at 593. See State Rd. Dep't v. Harvey, 142 So. 2d 778 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1962), where the complaint alleged that the State Road Department bad
caused certain construction work to be performed on the plaintiff's property
lnd sought to enjoin the trespass. After denying a motion to dismiss, the chancellor transferred the case to the law side for the purpose of awarding the property
owner damages. On appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal afflrmed in
part and reversed in part, declaring: "The suit commenced below by the filing of
the sworn amended complaint was proper insofar as it went. The chancellor
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Under such circumstances the taking is implied on the theory
that the damage was a necessary incident to the prosecution of
the work. Those agencies which under the power of eminent
domain set about to perform works that require the use of private property are charged with the responsibility of procuring
the title to or easements over and upon all such property as may
be required for their purposes, and the constitutional requirement to pay just compensation to the private owner will not be
frittered away by failure to take the preliminary precaution
of acquiring the necessary interests in the manner provided
by law.
In none of these cases was it suggested that the condemning authority had deliberately adopted a course of action calculated to injure the property owners. The damages which the property owners
suffered were mostly the unforeseen by-products of public improvement projects; sometimes the result of faulty planning or negligent execution; at other times unavoidable, perhaps. However, the attempted
evasion of responsibility for the proximate consequences of one's conduct predicates bad faith, notwithstanding the absence of an initial
intent to injure. Thus in these cases, where the condemning authority has refused to make restitution for a partial taking or other
injury, the courts have compelled it to face up to a responsibility
which was, in good conscience, owed to the property owner. As
Justice Terrell remarked in State Road Department v. Tharp, "the
State cannot afford to be other than square and generous."2 6
The results in these cases were possible only because the constitutional safeguards are self-executing and can be invoked directly to
compel the making of just compensation where there has been the
equivalent of an appropriation of private property by the state or its
agencies.2 7 Nor must the property owner necessarily proceed by
should have allowed the cause to proceed on to final hearing on the question
of whether there was in fact a taking, at which time, if the question be answered
affirmatively, it would be proper to transfer the cause to the law side of the
court for a determination of the amount of property taken and the value thereof
in a proceeding in the nature of condemnation proceedings." State Rd. Dep't
v. Harvey, 142 So. 2d 773, 774-75 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 19682). See also Florida
Power Corp. v. McNeely, 125 So. 2d 311, 320 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961); compare
Florida State Turnpike Authority v. Anhoco Corp., 116 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1959).
26. State Rd. Dep't v. Tharp, supra note 20, at 751, 1 So. 2d 870.
27. See Weir v. Palm Beach County, 85 So. 2d 865, 869 (Fla. 1956). In
Broward County v. Bouldin, 114 So. 2d 787 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), Justice
Thornal, speaking for the district court of appeal, said, at page 740: "The County, having the power of eminent domain, could properly be ordered to exercise
the power as a method of compensating the private property owner for the property taken for public purposes."
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suit in equity in order to invoke the self-executing constitutional
safeguards. In other jurisdictions, mandamus has been held to be a
proper remedy to compel the prosecution of condemnation proceedproperty has
ings and the payment of compensation, where private
28
been appropriated in contravention of organic law.

This policy, of permitting the property owner, under certain circumstances, to compel the state and its agencies to commence condemnation proceedings, is born out of the manifest inequity of otherwise leaving it to the pleasure of the condemning authority to elect
if and when it will pay for what it takes. For like reason, once proceedings have been commenced, the condemning authority should
not be permitted to abandon them at its pleasure, without regard to
the injury that has been inflicted.
ESTOPPEL AS BAIR TO ABANDONMENT

OF CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

Chapter 73 of the Florida Statutes, covering the procedure for the
taking of property after ascertainment of fair value, contains no specific provision for voluntary dismissal or abandonment of condemnation proceedings..2 9 If a special statutory proceeding of this kind does
not contain a specific provision governing a particular aspect of practice, the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure then apply.3 0 Once an
answer or motion for summary judgment has been served, "an action
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the
28. State v. Kauer, 156 Ohio St. 347, 102 N.E.2d 703 (1951); May v.
Whitlow, 201 Va. 533, 111 S.E.2d 804 (1960); Hicks v. Anderson, 182 Va.
195, 28 S.E.2d 629 (1944); see generally 55 C.J.S. Mandamus 178 (1948).
STAT. §73.13 (1961) comes perhaps the closest to doing so. It
29. F.
provides: "The petitioner, within ten days after the rendition of the judgment,
shall pay into the court for the use of the defendant the compensation ascertained
by the jury, or else the proceedings shall be null and void, unless, for good
cause, further time, not exceeding thirty days, be allowed by the court." This
section does not purport to create in the condemning authority an absolute right
of voluntary dismissal and abandonment, but merely establishes an outside limit
within which the condemning authority must pay the judgment or forfeit its
rights thereunder. In construing a like statute in Florida Cent. & P. R.R. v. Bear,
43 Fla. 319, 31 So. 287 (1901) the Florida Supreme Court observed that there
was nothing in the statute itself which deprived the condemning authority of
the right to abandon the proceedings at any time. That decision, however, was
in 1901, before the adoption of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and the
general restriction on a party's right to voluntary dismissal. The nature of said
restriction and its application to chapter 73 is discussed in the text immediately
following this note.
30. FLA. R. Cv. P., Rule A, provides that the rules are applicable to "all special
statutory proceedings in the Circuit Courts.... ".See Peeler v. Duval County
66 So. 2d 247, 250 (Fla. 1953).
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court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper."31
This restriction on the plaintiffs right to voluntary dismissal was
first introduced into Florida practice on January 1, 1950 by Rule 35
of the Florida Common Law Rules. Common Law Rule 35 was replaced on June 1, 1954 by Rule 1.35 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, but the language was identical3 2 until the recent amendment
3
of that rule, effective July 1, 1962. 3
Prior to adoption of Common Law Rule 35, the Supreme Court of
Florida has explained, it was "the established rule in this state that a
plaintiff was entitled, as of right, to take not only a voluntary non-suit
but also a compulsory or 'involuntary' non-suit, that is, one which
'is prompted by an adverse ruling of the court which is preclusive of a
recovery by the plaintiff . . . or impedes the proper presentation

of plaintiffs cause of action."' 3 4 In adopting Common Law Rule 35,
"it was intended only to preserve to a plaintiff the privileges respecting 'involuntary' non-suits under these and similar circumstances, as
developed in the previous decisions of this court."35
The foregoing conclusion was dictated by the clear language of
Common Law Rule 35,30 which, in subsection (a), pertaining to voluntary dismissals, left it to the court's discretion to control dismissals
once an answer or motion for summary judgment had been served,
whereas in subsection (b), pertaining to involuntary dismissals, the
statutory privilege of involuntary non-suit during trial, before the jury
retires,37 was specifically reserved, as a matter of right. Now, a plain-

tiff may no longer even have the statutory privilege of involuntary
non-suit during trial, since the most recent amendment of Rule 1.3538
has eliminated all reference in subsection (b) to the reservation of
that right.3 9
31. Fr. R. Civ. P. 1.35(a), (b).
32. See Committee Note, Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.35, FLA. STAT. (1961).
33. In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 139 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1962).
APPENDIX.
34. Crews v. Woods, 59 So. 2d 526, 527 (Fla. 1952).

35. Ibid.
36. Fla. B. Civ. P. 1.35,

See

FLA. STAT. (1961).

37. FLA. STAT. §54.09 (1961) provides: "No plaintiff shall take a non-suit
on trial unless he do so before the jury retire from the bar."
38. See In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 88.
39. In general, FLA. STAT. §25.371 (1961) provides that a rule of procedure
which conflicts with a statute supersedes the statutory provision. In the order
adopting the recent amendment of Rule 1.35, In re Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure,
139 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1962), the court expressly repealed all statutes inconsistent
with that amendment. Since the statutory privilege of involuntary non-suit, as
a matter of right, is inconsistent with and conflicts with Rule 1.35, now that
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In addition, in the same amendment of Rule 1.35, subsection
(a) was also changed so that under no circumstances may an action
in replevin or proceedings where the property has been seized or is
in custody of the court be dismissed by the plaintiff without permission
of court, even where the notice of dismissal is filed before the service
of an answer or motion for summary judgment. Since a condemnation suit is characterized by section 73.10(4) as an action in rem, voluntary dismissal by the condemning authority may not now be possible
at any stage of the proceedings, without permission of court. With
respect to the granting of such permission, the federal courts, in applying Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the language
of which is substantially the same as the most recent amendment of
Rule 1.35 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, have held that it is
properly within the court's discretion to deny the motion where such
40
dismissal would substantially prejudice the defendant.
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has said that it is committed to the doctrine that a condemning authority can dismiss the
proceedings at any time, 41 this is a rule based on public policy, favoring the conservation of public funds, which would be wasted if the
condemning authority were required to follow through and to pay
for property that was no longer needed. It is a good rule to guide a
court in the exercise of its discretion under Rule 1.35, so long as it does
not conflict with an even more compelling public policy, such as that
which exists when condemnation proceedings have been undertaken
in bad faith and the property owner has been substantially injured. 42
the express reservation of the statutory privilege has been eliminated from the
rule, it may be assumed that the rule has repealed and superseded the statute.
However, even if the privilege of involuntary non-suit, as a matter of right,
has not thus been abolished, it can be availed of only during the trial, when
the plaintiff is threatened by an adverse ruling which would preclude him from
going to the jury or impede him in the proper presentation of his cause of action
(see text at note 29 supra). It cannot, accordingly, be used capriciously, as a
pretext for bad-faith abandonment of the proceedings.
40. Shaffer v. Evans, 263 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1958); Harvey Aluminum,
Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 15 F.R.D 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); see Federal Say.
& Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 148 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1945).
41. See Conner v. State Rd. Dep't, 66 So. 2d 257, 258-59 (Fla. 1953). However, upon such abandonment, the condemning authority, even where acting
in good faith, must nonetheless pay to the property owner reasonable attorney's
fees. DeSoto County v. Highsmith, 60 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952). Presumably, appraiser's fees and other costs must also be paid. Cf. Dade County v. Brigham,
47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 1950). Authority for such payments is found in FL.&
STAT. §73.16 (1961).
See Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Blanshard, 85 Fla.
500, 96 So. 286 (1923); Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Blanshard, 77 Fla. 855,
82 So. 300 (1919).
42. The prevailing rule is stated as follows in Upper Third St. Dev. Corp.
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In the latter case, the public policy in favor of the conservation of
public funds is superseded by the public policy that abhors the unconscionable use of governmental power. Ordinary principles of
equitable estoppel should then apply, and the condemning authority
should be precluded from voluntary dismissal or abandonment of the
proceedings, just as any other litigant would be so precluded under
43
such circumstances.
44
The Supreme Court of Colorado has reached just such a result,
45
notwithstanding that the controlling statute expressly gave to the
condemning authority an express right to dismiss the proceedings at
any time. After a trial and verdict fixing the value of a bakery at an
amount higher than the condemning authority had anticipated, the
judge granted the condemning authority's motion to dismiss over the
objections of the property owner, who showed that he had built a
new plant to replace the one that was in the process of condemnation.
The supreme court held that principles of equitable estoppel qualified
the condemning authority's statutory right of dismissal and that it
was error for the judge to have dismissed the proceedings in view of
the showing of injury to the property owner.
In reaching its result, the Colorado court leaned heavily upon an
earlier California case,40 in which the property owner had also built
a replacement plant during the pendency of condemnation proceedings, and it was similarly concluded that principles of equitable estoppel barred a voluntary dismissal by the condemning authority. In
the California case, the property owner had appealed the verdict and
won the right to a new trial on the ground that full recognition had
not been given to all elements of damage. The case was thereupon
reset for trial, and on the appointed day counsel for the condemning
authority appeared and moved that the proceedings be dismissed.
v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 595, 600, 99 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1959): "The
majority rule in the United States is that, in the absence of bad faith or unreasonable delay upon the part of the condemning authority which instituted the condetonation proceeding, a landowner is not entitled to recover damages for the
abandonment of the proceeding."
43. See Sakoisky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1968), where
the Florida Supreme Court held that equitable estoppel will be applied against
a municipality, just as it would against an individual, to prevent the municipality
from arbitrarily rescinding a building permit.
44. Piz v. Housing Authority of the City & County of Denver, 132 Colo. 457,
289 P.2d 905 (1955).
45. CoLO. REv. STAT. §50-6-17 (1953) provides as follows: "The attorney
for the city, or city and county, commencing said proceeding shall have the right
to withdraw said proceedings, or to dismiss same as to one or more of said
defendants, or as to one or more parcels of land, without prejudice, at any stage
of the proceedings, upon the petitioner paying the costs thereof."
46. Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 2d 309, 44 P.2d 547 (1985).
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The judge granted the motion; the property owner then brought
mandamus against the judge to compel him to proceed with the trail to
final judgment. The Supreme Court of California ruled for the property owner and issued the writ. Subsequently, the holding in this
case was incorporated into the California Code.47
Although both the Colorado and California courts said that they
had found no bad faith on the part of the condemning authority, and
that it was not required that any bad faith be proved to raise such an
estoppel, in Florida, bad faith of one form or another, actual or constructive, is said to be a necessary element of any equitable estoppel.48 The contradiction, however, is probably only semantic, since
bad faith may be found not only in the frivolous, deceptive, or malicious commencement of the proceedings but equally in their unconscionable abandonment. 49 A man who seduces a girl on the promise
of matrimony and then abandons her after she becomes pregnant,
acts no less in bad faith because he had sincerely intended to marry
the girl at the time he compromised her. Similarly, the condemning
authority, its initial good intentions to the contrary notwithstanding,
should be obligated to follow through and to pay for the property,
once it has pushed things so far that, otherwise, the property owner
would be substantially and irremediably injured. Such injury may be
catastrophic to a private person, whereas the cost of indemnity is only
of fractional significance to the state and its agencies.
Procedurally, the issue usually arises on a hearing on the motion
of the condemning authority for voluntary dismissal. At that time,
the property owner should establish to the satisfaction of the court
47. CAL. Crv. Poc. CODE §1255a (1961) provides as follows: "(a) The
plaintiff may abandon the proceeding at any time after the filing of the complaint
and before the expiration of 30 days after final judgment, by serving on defendants and filing in court a written notice of such abandonment; and failure
to comply with Section 1251 of this code [providing for payment of judgment
within 30 days] shall constitute an implied abandonment of the proceeding.
(b) The court may, upon motion made within 30 days after such abandonment, set aside the abandonment if it determines that the position of the moving party has been substantially changed to his detriment in justifiable reliance
upon the proceeding and such party cannot be restored to substantially the
same position as if the proceeding has not been commenced."
48. In Steen v. Scott, 144 Fla. 702, 713, 198 So. 489, 493 (1940), it is said
that the person against whom an estoppel is sought to be raised must have been
found to have acted "wilfully, culpably or negligently."
49. The editors of FloridaJurisprudencesummarize it as follows: "Although
in its last analysis the doctrine of estoppel rests upon the principles of fraud,
it is necessary in many instances to extend the terms 'fraud' or 'fraudulent' to
situations which are more accurately described as 'unconscionable' or 'inequitable.'
While neither actual fraud nor bad faith is generally considered an essential
element, there must be either actual fraud involving an intent to deceive or
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that he will be substantially and irremediably injured if the condemning authority is then permitted to abandon the proceedings. If the
property owner carries this burden, the court should deny the motion
for dismissal. Ordinarily, the condemning authority has the burden
of going forward first with the proof of fair value at the condemnation
trial. If it declines to do so, its case may be by-passed and the jury
permitted to return a verdict based upon the evidence presented by
the property owner. If it refuses to pay the judgment entered upon
such a verdict, mandamus may be used to compel it to do so. 50
If the circumstances justify the raising of an estoppel, the condemning authority will not be heard to deny that the property has
already actually been taken.5 1 The condemning authority is thus
deemed in the eyes of the law to have taken the property without
paying for it, and the proceedings may be analogized to an emergency
taking under chapter 74 of the Florida Statutes, which covers the
situation in which the condemning authority takes first and pays
later. The only difference would be that there was not a preliminary
deposit into court as required thereunder. However, the fact that
the condemning authority has defaulted in the performance of this
requirement, designed for the protection of the property owner,
should not deprive the property owner of the other features of chapter 74 that are also designed for his protection. Specifically, section
constructive fraud resulting from gross negligence or from admissions, declarations, or conduct intended or calculated, or such as might reasonably be expected, to influence the other party and which have so misled him to his prejudice
that it would be a fraud to allow the true state of things to be shown." See 12
FLA.Jun. Estoppel and Waiver §35 (1957).
50. See note 28 supra. In City of Ocoee v. Harris, 155 Fla. 514, 20 So. 2d
674 (1945), and Peacock v. State, 122 Fla. 25, 164 So. 680 (1935), the Supreme
Court of Florida held that in ordinary actions, writ of mandamus would issue
to compel a municipality to pay and to make provision for payment of judgments.
However, the only condemnation case in Florida where it was tried appears to
be State v. Himes, 119 Fla. 428, 161 So. 560 (1935), where the writ was sought
only after the condemning authority had failed to pay the judgment within the
time limit specified in the statute (see note 29 supra). The court held that since
the judgment had then become null and void, there was nothing upon which to
base a writ of mandamus. However, the filing of mandamus proceedings within
the time limit specified in the statute should preserve the validity of the judgment, on the analogy of State Rd. Dep't v. Zetrouer, 105 Fla. 650, 142 So. 217
(1932), where it was held that the filing of an appeal by the condemning authority within the time limit specified in the statute preserved the validity of the
judgment.
51. Some such theory of estoppel may be the only remedy for a property
owner in Florida who has been placed in the same squeeze as the property owner
in the cemetery case (see discussion in text at note 6 supra), where a condemning authority adopts a resolution or publishes a plan of condemnation in
bad faith and then refrains from filing suit.
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74.10 provides that the condemning authority "shall be irrevocably
committed to the payment of the ultimate award;" section 74.07 provides for the entry of a money judgment against the condemning
authority; and section 74.14 provides for a writ of execution to enforce
the judgment.
Consequently, when the condemning authority refuses to compensate the owner for property that has actually been taken, or where
the condemning authority is estopped to deny such a taking, it should
become subject to the compulsory payment provisions of chapter 74,
which expressly amplify the self-executing constitutional safeguards.
CONCLUSION

No effort has been made in this article to disguise the author's
point of view. On the contrary, the express purpose has been to
demonstrate that a property owner is not helpless when a condemning
authority proceeds in bad faith. It is to be hoped that a legislative
provision, similar to that in effect in California, may be adopted, or
that there may be further judicial attrition of the sovereign immunity barrier. However, if neither development has come to pass
when the moment of truth arrives, counsel will have to choose a remedy that has not yet been certified by prior Florida authority. Fortunately, the opportunity for growth in this important area of Florida
case law is not yet precluded by stare decisis, and there is every reason to expect that the Florida courts will give the property owner a
sympathetic hearing.
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APPENDIX

Rule 1.85. Dismissal of Actions.
(a) Voluntary Dismissal; Effect thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to provisions hereof, except in
actions in replevin or proceedings wherein property has been seized or is in the
custody of the court, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order
of court (i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the
adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment or decree,
whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.
Without Prejudice, When. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal
or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in any court of this state an action based on or including the
same claim.
(2) By Order of Court; If Counterclaim. Except as provided in paragraph
(1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been served by a defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall
not be dismissed against defendant's objections unless the counterclaim can
remain pending for independent adjudication by the court.
Without Prejudice. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under
the foregoing paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary Dismissal. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him.
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is
not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In an action tried by the
court without a jury the court as trier of the facts may then determine them and
render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment
until the close of all the evidence.
With Prejudice. Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under the foregoing paragraph, other than a dismissal for lack
of jurisdiction, for improper venue or for the lack of an indispensable party,
operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
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